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The main objective of this paper is to provide an ex-ante assessment of the poverty and 
income distribution impacts of the Central American Free Trade Area agreement on 
Nicaragua. A general equilibrium macro model is used to simulate trade reform scenarios 
and estimate their price effects, while a micro-module maps these price changes into real 
income changes at the individual household level. A useful insight from this analysis is 
that even if the final total impact on poverty is not too large, its dispersion across 
households – due to their heterogeneity of factor endowments, inputs use, commodity 
production, and consumption preferences – is significant and should be taken into 
account when designing compensatory policies. Additionally, growth and redistribution 
decomposition shows that, at least in the short to medium run, redistribution can be as 
important as growth. The main policy message that emerges from the paper is that 
Nicaragua should consider enlarging its own liberalization to countries other than the 
U.S. to boost trade-induced poverty reductions. 
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The debate on the Dominican Republic - Central American Free Trade Agreement 
(DR-CAFTA) between the U.S., five Central American countries (Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador), and the Dominican Republic has 
been heated by the usual arguments surrounding recent trade deals. A seemingly 
persuasive argument against these deals is that although new jobs in Central America 
may be generated, this may be done at the expense of American jobs and to the detriment 
of local workers hired in jobs that do not comply with minimum labor standards.
1 The 
persuasiveness of this argument comes from its partiality; the argument considers only 
the distributional effects of trade reforms and the fact that these reforms create winners 
and losers, with the poor being most likely to be the latter. Similarly, the pro-trade-deals 
assumptions that free trade indisputably favors growth and that growth trickles down to 
the poor are partial and deserve scrutiny. A careful assessment of whether trade reform 
can be beneficial to poor people and what can be done in the short-term to correct 
potential anti-poor effects is needed to settle the debate, but it is also a difficult task.  
There are various channels through which trade liberalization affects the poor as 
discussed in conceptual terms by McCulloch, Winters and Cirera (2001), although 
empirical evidence is rather thin, disparate and piecemeal. In this study, a numerical 
simulation model – a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model – in conjunction with 
a non-behavioral micro-simulation module based on household survey data for 
Nicaragua
2 is used to estimate ex-ante the effects of a DR-CAFTA-like trade shock on 
poverty. The CGE model has the advantage of being a counterfactual analysis tool that 
can generate price effects which are directly and unequivocally linked to a trade reform. 
The changes in relative factor prices (particularly between labor and capital 
remunerations, and between skilled and unskilled labor wages) and relative goods prices 
(such as between food and non-food items) are then linked to the household survey to 
generate income distribution effects. This methodology does not maintain full 
                                                 
1 See Elizabeth Becker’s CAFTA article on the New York Times article, April 6
th, 2004.  
2 For similar modeling frameworks see Ravallion and Chen (2004), Nicita and Olarreaga (2004), Bussolo, 
Lay, and van der Mensbrugghe (2005), Bussolo and Medvedev (2005), Hertel et al. (2004), Ianchovichina 
et al. (2001).   3
consistency between the micro data and the CGE results; however, by combining the two, 
it maps aggregate results from the CGE to the detailed information available in the 
household survey and provides a much more nuanced and useful analysis of poverty 
impact. This approach also allows decomposing the total effect on poverty into an 
aggregate income growth component and a redistribution component. 
A useful insight from this analysis is that even if the total impact on poverty is not 
too large, its dispersion across households – due to their heterogeneity of factor 
endowments, inputs use, commodity production, and consumption preferences – is 
significant and this should help in designing compensatory policies. Additionally, our 
growth and redistribution decomposition shows that, at least in the short to medium run, 
redistribution can be as important as growth. 
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents the CGE model, the micro 
module and the relevant data. The first part of section 3 describes the general equilibrium 
results of the trade policy shocks, and the second part the poverty implications. The final 
section presents some conclusions. 
 
 
2  Measuring the effects of trade reforms on poverty: linking a 
CGE model to household surveys 
 
This section describes the main features of the CGE model and household survey 
micro-simulation module.  
 
The Nicaragua general equilibrium model and its data 
 
A 2000 Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) represents the initial benchmark 
equilibrium for the CGE model. This SAM, which includes 39 sectors, 39 commodities, 3 
factors (skilled and unskilled labor and one composite capital), an aggregate household 
account, and other accounts (government, savings and investment, and the Rest of the 
World), has been assembled from various sources incorporating data from the 2000 
Input-Output Table and the 2001 Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS). As   4
explained in more detail in the results section, the quality of the initial dataset represented 
by this SAM directly influences the quality of the model results. For this reason, 
particular attention has been devoted in estimating the value added, trade, and tariff 
components of the SAM.
3  
The CGE model is based on a standard neoclassical general equilibrium model, 
i.e. a model that combines the standard consumer and producer theories and the 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson trade theory with a compatible data-set for a specific 
country, and the following subsections describe its main features.  
Production. Output results from nested CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) 
functions that, at the top level, combine intermediate and value added aggregates. At the 
second level, the intermediate aggregates are obtained combining all products in fixed 
proportions (Leontief structure), and the value added is an aggregation of the primary 
factors. The full structure of production nests is shown in the annex. 
Income Distribution and Absorption. Labor income and capital revenues are allocated to 
households according to a fixed coefficient distribution matrix derived from the original 
SAM. One of the main advantages of using the micro-module is to enrich this rather 
crude macro distribution mechanism. Private consumption demand is obtained through 
maximization of household specific utility function following the Linear Expenditure 
System (LES). Household utility is a function of consumption of different goods. Once 
their total value is determined, government and investment demands
4 are disaggregated 
into sectoral demands according to fixed coefficient functions. 
International Trade. The model assumes imperfect substitution among goods originating in 
different geographical areas.
5 Import demand results from a CES aggregation function of 
domestic and imported goods. Export supply is symmetrically modeled as a Constant Elasticity 
of Transformation (CET) function. Producers allocate their output to domestic or foreign markets 
according to relative prices. Under the small country assumption, Nicaragua is unable to 
influence world prices and its imports and exports prices are treated as exogenous. Assumptions 
                                                 
3 For more details on the SAM, see Bussolo (2004) and the Annex to this paper. 
4 Aggregate investment is set equal to aggregate savings, while aggregate government expenditures are 
exogenously fixed. 
5 See Armington (1969) for details.   5
of imperfect substitution and imperfect transformability grant a certain degree of autonomy of 
domestic prices with respect to foreign prices and prevent the model from generating corner 
solutions. Furthermore, they permit the model from cross-hauling a feature normally observed in 
real economies. The balance of payments equilibrium is determined by the equality of foreign 
savings (which are exogenous) to the value of the current account. With fixed world prices and 
capital inflows, all adjustments are accommodated by changes in the real exchange rates: 
increased import demand, due to trade liberalization, must be financed by increased exports, and 
these can expand due to improved resource allocation. Price decreases in importables drive 
resources toward export sectors and contribute to falling domestic resource costs (or real 
exchange rate depreciation).  
Factor Markets. Labor is divided into two categories: skilled and unskilled. These 
categories are considered imperfectly substitutable inputs in the production process. 
Moreover, some degree of market segmentation is assumed: composite capital is sector 
specific, and labor markets are segmented between agriculture and non-agriculture, with 
labor fully mobile within each of the two broad sectors, but fully immobile across them. 
These restrictive conditions are imposed on the modeling framework so that it mimics in 
the best possible and least contentious way the short-term impact of trade reforms on the 
Nicaraguan economy. Dynamic features, market imperfections, and other complications 
could be introduced. However, questions about the links between trade policy and growth 
would emerge and, although important, is a much more difficult issue.
6 Finally, the 
segmented version of the model also facilitates linking the macro results of the CGE 
model to the household survey micro-model, where households are not allowed to 
respond to price changes by migrating, increasing their human capital endowments, or 
even changing their consumption choices. 
  The labor market specification is a key element of the model and an important 
driver of poverty and distributional results. Therefore, its specification calls for some 
clarification and justification. The labor market skill segmentation
7 has become a 
                                                 
6 No systematic analysis of the ex-ante predictions of CGE studies exists; however, a few papers have 
evaluated these models’ performance in predicting the NAFTA outcomes and have found that they did not 
score too well, especially in terms of sectoral reallocations (i.e., relative growth rates of exports and 
production). Generally, these studies highlight that introducing dynamic effects in these models is very 
difficult. For an example of these studies on NAFTA see Kehoe (2003). 
7 See Taubman and Wachter (1986) for a general discussion of labor market segmentation.   6
standard assumption in CGE modeling and it is easily justifiable for the case of 
Nicaragua, where inequalities in educational endowments and access to education 
support this assumption.  
 
  The assumption that the market for labor is further segmented into agricultural 
and non-agricultural activities is more controversial. To test its validity, we check 
whether incomes in agriculture are still below incomes in other sectors once the 
following wage determinants are controlled for: education, experience, gender, and 
employment-status variables such as self-employment. Additionally, to account for price 
differentials across space, geographical variables capturing differences among 
Nicaraguan regions are included in the wage estimation. Taking the largest non-
agricultural sector of employment, “commerce”, as a reference group, the regression 
analysis shows that agricultural individual labor incomes are significantly below this 
reference group and the gap widens between unskilled and skilled workers. 
 
Table 1: Estimation results for the labor market segmentation 
No. of obs. 1255652 No. of obs. 3E+05
F(15, 1255636) 13677 F(15, 318350) 9144
Prob > F 0.0000 Prob > F 0
R-squared 0.1431 R-squared 0.302
Root MSE 1.2071 Root MSE 1.105
Robust Robust
Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t|
Individual characteristics
   Years of schooling 0.060 3.09E-04 194.8 0.000 0.0596 0.0608 0.227 9.82E-04 230.8 0.000 0.2246 0.2285
   Experience 0.069 2.45E-04 279.9 0.000 0.0681 0.0691 0.078 6.50E-04 120.1 0.000 0.0767 0.0793
   Experience squared -0.001 3.47E-06 -227.0 0.000 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.001 1.59E-05 -68.5 0.000 -0.0011 -0.0011
   Female -0.393 0.003 -149.1 0.000 -0.3983 -0.3880 -0.411 0.004 -101.6 0.000 -0.4188 -0.4029
Geographical dummies
   urban 0.192 0.003 73.5 0.000 0.1868 0.1970 0.044 0.006 7.6 0.000 0.0328 0.0557
   (Managua)
   Pacific -0.131 0.003 -45.5 0.000 -0.1365 -0.1252 -0.195 0.005 -40.0 0.000 -0.2050 -0.1858
   Central -0.173 0.003 -54.3 0.000 -0.1795 -0.1670 -0.157 0.005 -31.0 0.000 -0.1672 -0.1473
   Atalantic 0.053 0.004 12.6 0.000 0.0448 0.0613 -0.041 0.008 -5.1 0.000 -0.0563 -0.0250
Self-employed -0.146 0.003 -56.9 0.000 -0.1506 -0.1406 -0.438 0.006 -76.8 0.000 -0.4489 -0.4266
Sectoral dummies
   Agriculture -0.504 0.003 -145.7 0.000 -0.5111 -0.4975 -0.578 0.012 -48.3 0.000 -0.6012 -0.5543
   Mining and gas -0.021 0.009 -2.3 0.022 -0.0398 -0.0031 0.483 0.008 62.8 0.000 0.4684 0.4986
   Manufacturing -0.150 0.003 -43.3 0.000 -0.1563 -0.1428 -0.283 0.008 -37.5 0.000 -0.2981 -0.2685
   Construction -0.258 0.005 -53.8 0.000 -0.2673 -0.2485 -0.601 0.013 -47.7 0.000 -0.6260 -0.5765
   (Commerce)
   Services -0.222 0.004 -61.8 0.000 -0.2288 -0.2147 -0.001 0.007 -0.1 0.922 -0.0140 0.0127
   Government services 0.023 0.005 4.2 0.000 0.0122 0.0338 -0.390 0.005 -73.7 0.000 -0.4008 -0.3800
Constant 7.899 0.006 1411.2 0.000 7.8881 7.9100 6.801 0.014 497.7 0.000 6.7739 6.8275
[95% Confi. Interval] [95% Confi. Interval]
Wage equation for testing segmentation hypothesis - Unskilled Skilled
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  There can be a number of reasons for observing this income gap between 
agricultural and non-agricultural employment. One explanation may be that agricultural 
income, in particular from self-employment, is systematically underreported. However, 
we control for this by including a self-employed dummy, which in fact shows a negative 
sign in support of this hypothesis. Another explanation for the sectoral income 
differential may lie in positive externalities associated with agricultural employment. 
Examples of such externalities include food self-sufficiency and employment 
opportunities for other family members. Yet, one can also easily think of negative 
externalities of agricultural employment, such as the exposure to weather shocks or hard 
physical work. These externalities are difficult if not impossible to quantify.  
  If we accept the existence of an income differential between agriculture and non-
agricultural sectors, the question then becomes why individuals do not respond to this 
differential by moving to the non-agricultural sector until incomes in both sectors 
equalize. A likely answer is that there must be barriers to mobility between agricultural 
and non-agricultural employment and that these barriers are relevant to the period under 
our analysis. A potentially important factor that may act as a barrier to mobility, although 
we do not test for this hypothesis, is represented by the specificity of human capital 
acquired in the agricultural sector.
8 
Model Closures. The equilibrium condition on the balance of payments is combined with 
other closure conditions so that the model can be solved for each period. First, consider 
the government budget. Its surplus is fixed and the household income tax schedule shifts 
in order to achieve the predetermined net government position. Second, investment must 
equal savings, which originate from households, corporations, government and the Rest 
of the World. Aggregate investment is set equal to aggregate savings, while aggregate 
government expenditures are exogenously fixed. 
 
                                                 
8 Results in Table 1 show that wage differentials also exist across other sectors. One could thus argue that 
sectoral segmentation affects labor markets beyond our assumption of the two agricultural and non-
agricultural segments. However, without additional analysis, mobility barriers among say, services and 
manufacturing, seem less plausible and, judging from the sectoral dummies’ coefficients in the estimations, 
seem lower than those between agriculture and the rest of the economy.    8
The micro module: linking household surveys to the CGE model 
 
Poverty effects of trade reforms are estimated using a top-down approach. 
Initially the CGE model calculates the new equilibrium (i.e., new relative prices and 
quantities for factors and commodities) following a trade shock. Then prices are 
transferred to the micro module to estimate a new income distribution and poverty effects 
are calculated. No feedback from the micro module to the macro model is explicitly 
accounted for in this version. The following equation
9 represents the core of the micro 
module:  
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where the relative gains or losses (W represents welfare) for each household (h) depend 
on: 1) changes in prices for purchased goods (pg, where a dot represents percentage 
change) and the initial share of expenditure on each good (
c
g h, θ ); 2) changes in factor 
returns (w stands for returns to skilled and unskilled labor, and π is returns to capital) and 
the shares of total initial income by source (
l
h θ  and 
kap
h θ ); 3) remittances and other 
transfers which depend on the wage rate and the government revenues. Income by source 
is calculated for each member of the household, and the above equation, to keep notation 
simple, shows results after aggregating incomes for each individual in the same 
household. Once the changes in welfare are calculated, a new distribution of income is 
generated and this counterfactual distribution is then compared to the initial distribution. 
  The main advantage of this approach is that it takes into account important 
sources of heterogeneity across households given that the structure of income by type and 
the composition of consumption by commodity, the various θ’s in the above equation, are 
household specific. A large literature on trade and poverty
10 has shown that changes in 
the distribution of income (or consumption) might differ considerably across different 
                                                 
9 The formal derivation of this equation is presented in the Annex to this paper. 
10 See Winters et al (2004) for an excellent survey.   9
groups of households and that predetermined groupings may not capture the whole 
spectrum of possible outcomes. Poor households themselves are poor for different 
reasons and designing compensatory policies that are targeted to the right recipients can 
be greatly facilitated by having a whole new counterfactual distribution. In the new 
distribution, households, as well as individuals, can be identified according to the full set 
of socio-economic characteristics recorded in the survey. It is thus easier to identify a 
specific characteristic – such as region of residence, employment status, gender, 
education, age, etc. – that may strongly correlate with larger than average losses from the 
trade policy reform and then use this information in targeting compensatory measures. 
  Clearly how this new counterfactual distribution is generated is rather important. 
The above equation only considers first order effects and excludes important second 
order mechanisms that may account for large income changes. Specifically, movements 
in and out of employment or across sectors of production are excluded as well as 
substitution in consumption, although not accounting for the latter does not normally 
result in large errors. This approach is better suited to estimating short run impacts and it 
may overestimate the effects of a trade shock, given that quantity adjustments and 
substitutions are ruled out. Acknowledging these limitations, the main advantages are 
transparency and low data requirements, and ease of implementation. 
  Equation (1) implies that, for each household, individual incomes can be readily 
imputed to the relevant factors of production, namely the two labor types and the 
composite capital. This is fairly straightforward for urban wage-workers. However, for a 
large group of the Nicaraguan population this imputation is not obvious. As explained in 
the next subsection, disaggregating income for the self-employed workers in the farm 
sector can be a laborious and error prone procedure; the labor and capital components are 
not often easily separable. For households whose heads belong to this group of workers, 
an approach that bypasses this imputation has been used. This is represented by the 
following equation:  
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   10
where, as before, the relative change in welfare is represented by a change in 
consumption (the last term in the left hand side of the equation), by a change in explicit 
wage earnings and by profit generated via the activity run by the household (the term in 
squared brackets). This is estimated as the difference between sales (holding constant the 
quantity shares of the different goods sold θj
O) and input costs (again without changing 
the structure of input quantities θj
I).  
 
  Finally, it should be noted that the consumption of home production (auto-
consumption hereafter) has been explicitly excluded from the computations in both 
equations (1) and (2) given that price changes – in the short run, and those of the order of 
magnitude considered here – do not affect it. In terms of equation (2), this means that not 
only does final consumption need to exclude auto-consumption, but also that input costs 
have to be netted of the costs related to production for auto-consumption. 
 
Household survey data preparation and brief description of the pre-liberalization 
income distribution 
 
  The household survey used for the computations is the LSMS 2001 for 
Nicaragua. At the individual level, the active employed population aged more than 12 
years are classified into skilled and unskilled according to their education level. The 
employed population is also classified into wage-workers and self-employed. For wage-
workers, the entire factor-related income is either unskilled or skilled labor income. 
  In the first stage, we assume that income reported by the self-employed is 
assumed to have both a labor and a capital component. To separate these two 
components, a wage for the self-employed is imputed based on a wage equation that is 
estimated for the wage-workers separately for rural and urban areas. The wage equation 
is a simple Mincerian wage equation with log wage earnings as the dependent variable 
and education, education squared, age, age squared, and additional regional and sectoral 
dummies as explanatory variables. The coefficients of these wage equations are then used 
to impute a wage for the self-employed. The difference between the reported income 
from self-employment and the imputed wage is assumed to represent the capital   11
component of self-employment income. In rural areas, the difference should be 
interpreted as a mixed factor income from land and capital, as the micro-data do not 
allow differentiating between these two factors. This procedure yields some negative 
differences that were set to zero, though the proportion of self-employed with an imputed 
wage higher than their reported self-employment earnings was quite low. In the second 
stage, equation (2) is used to estimate incomes for households whose heads were 
classified as self-employed farmers.
11  
  Total household income is then calculated by aggregating the incomes of 
individual household members. This household income includes, in addition to the capital 
income from self-employment, other capital incomes such as dividends, interest and 
property rental income. It also includes transfers that consist of imputed rent, remittances, 
gifts, charities and pensions. In addition, for agricultural self-employed households, 
household income is augmented by auto-consumption. 
 
                                                 
11 These two methods, namely using just equation (1) for the whole sample or a combination of the two 
equations applied to the relevant households, do not result in very different poverty assessments. A 
complete set of results across all the methods is available upon request.    12























Notes: The unskilled, skilled, and capital stacked areas measure the percent contribution of each factor to that part of 
income which is affected by factor price changes (auto-consumption and transfers are a large fraction of the total income 
of the poor but they are not affected by price changes in the market). The food line represents the percentage of 
(marketed) food consumption on total (marketed) consumption. Both factor contributions and food percentages are 
measured for each centile in the population ordered by income levels.     
 
  Given that the impact of liberalization-induced price changes on households 
depends on the relative importance of various income sources and on consumption 
patterns, it is worth examining how Nicaraguan households earn and spend their income. 
Figure 1 shows the factor income shares for Nicaragua when its whole population is 
ordered in income centiles. 
Some salient features of the Nicaraguan income distribution are highlighted by 
this graph. Auto-consumption and transfers, income components not directly linked to 
market prices, represent a large share of income for the poorest household, up to 60%, 
whereas they appear much less relevant for the upper income centiles. Similarly, toward 
the top part of the distribution, unskilled labor, the most important source of income for 
the poorer, is substituted for skilled labor and capital revenues. Finally, food related 
expenses drop from about 60% of total consumption to about 40% as we move from poor 
to rich household. This graph visually summarizes some key characteristics of income   13
distribution for the whole population in Nicaragua. Table 2 expands the analysis of 
income distribution by grouping households according to income sources, sector of 
employment and geographic location.  
Table 2: Income distribution in Nicaragua (2001), Income % by source, sector and location   
skilled unskill capital skilled unskill capital skilled unskill skilled unskill transfer autocons food %
All 0.29 6.58 3.28 1.51 9.67 7.27 0.24 11.47 10.05 23.87 19.61 6.12 51.17
Poor-Urban 0.20 2.13 0.45 1.43 15.29 4.12 0.11 10.52 6.31 33.50 23.72 2.02 54.18
Poor-Rural 0.25 14.45 3.07 0.10 5.43 1.50 0.12 22.49 1.81 14.91 20.88 14.99 56.23
NPoor-Urban 0.24 0.89 0.97 2.98 10.47 13.27 0.41 3.52 20.90 26.70 18.79 0.85 45.94
NPoor_Rural 0.61 12.70 13.36 0.68 6.69 8.35 0.22 11.90 5.18 18.39 12.97 8.94 49.76
Income decile (all)
1 0.39 11.01 1.28 0.12 5.99 0.73 0.00 21.67 0.96 17.41 28.76 11.20 58.44
2 0.06 12.42 2.87 0.51 10.75 1.71 0.10 19.58 1.95 15.83 21.21 13.00 55.00
3 0.40 6.51 1.33 1.00 12.73 3.29 0.14 18.18 2.26 26.26 21.13 6.76 56.08
4 0.07 7.29 1.78 0.91 10.85 3.24 0.19 13.95 5.44 28.26 19.32 8.69 53.46
5 0.22 6.35 1.99 1.18 9.70 4.66 0.15 11.17 8.99 29.84 20.63 5.11 53.51
6 0.24 6.51 5.02 0.88 11.07 6.60 0.35 11.25 5.77 28.62 17.01 6.69 51.26
7 0.12 4.13 3.58 1.83 10.43 6.37 0.19 8.57 12.17 29.61 19.77 3.23 52.16
8 0.23 4.57 3.36 1.49 10.57 8.85 0.01 5.02 17.03 27.85 17.44 3.59 49.12
9 0.34 4.00 4.50 2.39 9.35 14.47 0.52 2.75 19.35 24.46 15.74 2.12 45.35
10 0.83 3.01 7.12 4.75 5.25 22.77 0.70 2.56 26.62 10.57 15.05 0.78 37.29
Income decile (urban)
1 0.34 3.55 0.55 0.63 13.72 1.92 0.00 16.99 2.61 27.82 27.88 3.18 55.90
2 0.10 2.01 0.64 2.12 19.77 4.53 0.00 7.21 2.52 34.76 24.73 1.62 54.05
3 0.09 1.89 0.10 1.56 14.90 4.76 0.18 11.68 8.43 35.22 18.88 2.33 54.46
4 0.29 1.15 0.53 1.63 12.43 5.20 0.27 6.17 11.87 35.86 23.57 1.04 52.54
5 0.03 1.60 0.90 1.09 13.57 7.67 0.32 8.32 8.15 37.22 19.70 1.43 51.91
6 0.03 0.60 0.36 2.53 12.98 7.60 0.33 4.69 15.59 31.75 22.57 0.96 51.06
7 0.33 1.45 0.91 1.89 11.37 8.39 0.01 3.18 20.48 31.14 19.40 1.45 48.79
8 0.14 0.41 0.51 2.93 11.18 11.02 0.25 0.76 22.73 31.99 17.30 0.78 44.90
9 0.05 0.46 0.66 4.72 9.42 21.03 1.07 2.33 26.98 17.51 15.54 0.22 45.04
10 0.84 0.69 2.48 4.55 4.51 24.34 0.50 1.67 31.73 10.61 17.94 0.17 33.47
Income decile (rural)
1 0.59 14.30 1.83 0.00 3.99 0.32 0.00 19.20 0.00 12.59 30.04 17.14 59.55
2 0.00 17.89 1.96 0.00 5.03 0.47 0.00 25.48 0.64 8.63 23.03 16.86 56.80
3 0.01 16.77 5.18 0.00 4.08 0.41 0.00 26.08 1.40 11.55 18.06 16.46 56.18
4 0.23 10.96 2.17 0.00 7.00 0.93 0.25 25.31 2.88 16.02 20.22 14.03 55.94
5 0.61 13.04 2.82 0.09 6.43 3.78 0.54 22.96 0.90 16.86 17.41 14.56 56.53
6 0.15 13.66 4.34 0.57 5.74 2.29 0.00 17.72 4.28 21.85 17.11 12.28 52.81
7 0.41 13.09 7.96 0.52 8.52 5.63 0.38 16.19 3.55 15.03 16.53 12.18 51.41
8 0.26 12.22 10.01 0.21 5.68 3.13 0.00 16.26 4.46 23.87 13.04 10.87 53.62
9 0.16 11.56 8.87 0.66 7.50 6.92 0.00 10.99 6.53 24.14 14.52 8.14 52.20
10 1.39 14.71 22.86 1.09 4.88 15.93 0.40 6.43 5.66 11.06 10.13 5.45 43.73
self-employed wages
farm non-farm farm non-farm
 
 
For the population as a whole, non-farm unskilled wages are found to be the 
largest source of income, accounting for almost one-quarter of total income (see the first 
row of Table 2). However, there are substantial differences in these shares depending on 
how well-off the household is and whether the household resides in the urban or rural 
sector (which is a household characteristic different from that of earning a large share of 
income from farm activities). For the poorest decile income group, both in urban and   14
rural areas, transfers make up the highest share of total income, while capital is an 
important source of income only for higher income households. Skilled labor is a minor 
source of income for most households except for those in the upper decile income groups 
in the urban sector.  
Regarding the consumption side, average food share is about 51%. It remains 
above 50% for all rural households except for those in the highest income decile group, 
whereas it is less than 50% for the upper four income groups and drops to one-third of 
total expenditure for the highest income decile in the urban sector. It should also be 
pointed out that auto-consumption has a relatively high share for less well-off households 
in the rural sector. The implication is that these households are less engaged in market 
transaction and would benefit or suffer less from the price shocks depending on whether 
the shocks are positive or negative. 
Summing up, even at the high level of aggregation of Table 2, different groups of 
households display a high degree of heterogeneity more so across their income sources 
than in their consumption patterns. Incomes appear to originate from few sources for the 
poor. The rural poor earn on average 40% of their income from the farm sector, which is 
a very high share considering that 36% of income is attributed to transfers and auto-
consumption while the remaining share that is not directly related to agriculture account 
for only 24%. Furthermore, this is an average across all poor rural households; the 
poorest have even higher degree of concentration in their income sources.   
Figure 2 reports the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration calculated as 
the sum of the squared shares of different income sources for the ten deciles of rural 
households and it shows an unambiguous downward trend as income rises, meaning that 
poorer households have income originating from a more concentrated set of sources.     15
Figure 2: Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration of income sources (rural households by 
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This strong dependence on a few income sources, especially for the poor 
households, may be a result of a rational choice aiming at avoiding risks, or it may reflect 
more limited employment opportunities due to limited skills and remote location. A 
consequence of this limited number of income sources is that it may trap these 
households in their poverty condition. Recent studies estimating households’ response to 
price incentives such as those induced by trade reforms show that poor households 
respond less to these incentives. Deininger and Olinto (2000) showed that, for households 
in Zambia, the absence of key productive assets (draft animals, implements) was a major 
limitation in exploiting opportunities created by trade liberalization. López, Nash and 
Stanton (1995) found that the level of capital inputs was, on average, directly related to 
the responsiveness to price incentives across a sample of farm households in Mexico.  
These suggest that the micro analysis approach in this paper, where no quantity 
response nor occupational/sectoral change is allowed, is appropriate and that its intrinsic 
bias in considering just first order effects may be less significant for the poor households 
that are our primary interest. Finally, this literature, together with the segmentation 
regression shown above, supports the assumption of segmented markets in the CGE 
model, making the whole macro-micro analysis more consistent. 
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3  Poverty effects of trade policy reforms  
 
  This section first presents the results of the general equilibrium model and then 
the poverty estimations obtained by linking changes in the macro variables to the 
household survey data.  
 
3.1  Policy scenarios  
 
  The Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) 
is a recently negotiated free trade agreement (FTA) between Central American countries 
(Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua), the Dominican Republic 
and the U.S.
12 Central American countries have already been enjoying the preferential 
market access to US markets through the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) program. DR-
CAFTA will not only consolidate and formalize these existing benefits, but also provide 
greater market access by eliminating remaining tariffs on goods that have been exempted 
from the CBI preferences. The agreement also incorporates a gradual opening of Central 
American markets for US agricultural commodities.
13 Other main achievements of DR-
CAFTA include the greater flexibility of rules of origin for textiles and apparel, 
commitments to help producers meet sanitary and phytosanitary standards required for 
the entry into the U.S., reciprocal commitments on access to service markets, and the 
institutional and legal framework to ease foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to the 
region.
14 Besides providing almost full free access to one of their major markets, the DR-
CAFTA agreement should assist the implementation of additional domestic market 
reforms, and produce significant efficiency gains due to resource reallocations toward 
more competitive sectors by requiring reciprocal opening. However, as brilliantly 
                                                 
12 DR-CAFTA was approved by the US Senate and House of Representatives in June-July 2005 and it has 
also been approved by the legislatures in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, while its approval is 
pending in Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua as of writing this paper. 
13 DR-CAFTA, however, exempts from further liberalization some sensitive agricultural products including 
sugar imports to the U.S., white maize imports to four Central American countries (El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua), and potatoes and onions to Costa Rica.  
14 For more details see: (Francois et al., 2005; World Bank, 2005).   17
illustrated by the Chilean multi-pronged strategy of trade liberalization,
15 CAFTA is just 
one of the many trade options that the Central American countries can pursue, and 
probably the best way to evaluate the opportunities offered by such a regional agreement 
is to compare it with a benchmark case of full liberalization. Two main scenarios are 
thereby considered: 1) a CAFTA type reciprocal liberalization, and 2) a full unilateral 
non-discriminatory trade liberalization. The potential advantages and disadvantages of 
the reciprocal liberalization entailed by the regional scenario are illustrated by further 
decomposing the CAFTA scenario into two separate unilateral liberalizations: first, 
Nicaragua liberalizes vis-à-vis the U.S., which does not reciprocate, and then the U.S. 
unilaterally liberalizes vis-à-vis Nicaragua. Although not being a realistic policy choice, 
the full unilateral liberalization provides a useful measure against which CAFTA can be 
evaluated.  
  In all the simulations, only tariffs are modified and they are completely 
eliminated in one step with no attempt to capture any sequencing across sectors or phase-
out periods. As mentioned earlier, each of the simulations is based on a comparative 
static framework with no capital accumulation, no changes in labor supply or skill levels, 
and factor market segmentation. The short-term time horizon implicit in this CGE set up 
was assumed to focus on the immediate impact of trade shocks on poverty and to 
facilitate communication between the macro and micro modules, where no substitution 
(i.e., no long term behavior) is allowed. 
  Additional simulations where factor mobility restrictions are eliminated are 
carried out to complete the analysis and assess the implication of the assumption of factor 
markets segmentation. However, in these cases, given the behavioral limitations imposed 
on the micro module, poverty and income distribution results will only be inferred from 
the macro results.  
                                                 
15 Chile started liberalizing trade unilaterally toward the end of the 1970s and then moved toward signing 
trade agreements in the early 1990s, the idea being that it could get useful concessions from trade partners 
that were not available with unilateral tariff reductions. Chile has signed Agreements with most economies 
in South America: Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and Mercosur. Chile has also 
signed standard FTAs with the: European Union, Canada, Mexico, the United States, EFTA, Central 
America, and a recently ratified agreement with South Korea. Besides, Chile enjoys full membership of the 
WTO and benefits from the multilateral rounds of trade liberalization under the WTO’s auspices. Through 
this strategy, Chile has achieved almost fully free access to most OECD markets and the other developing 
countries relevant to its trade.    18
 
3.2  Trade reforms: macro results first…  
 
  In a general equilibrium model all relative prices and quantities are determined 
simultaneously. However, to disentangle the trade policy reform effects on the economy, 
it is helpful to describe the adjustment process as if it were sequential. First, tariffs are 
reduced and impact import flows, which in turn displaces domestic production and 
generates resource reallocations. These shifts, by interacting with factor supply and 
demand, determine factor prices, and combined with new goods prices, ultimately affect 
the household’s real income level. Then, changed household incomes feed back into the 
system through changes in consumption choices and the process continues until a new 
equilibrium is reached. Three main elements determine the position – i.e., the values of 
the endogenous variables – of the new equilibrium: 1) the starting level of some key 
variables in the initial equilibrium, i.e., the prices and quantities implicit in the initial 
SAM; 2) the functional forms of the model’s behavioral equations; and 3) some key 
parameters, namely substitution elasticities among factors in the production process and, 
for a trade reform analysis, the elasticities of substitution in demand between domestic 
and imported commodities and the elasticity of transformation in supply between 
domestic and foreign markets. A broad consensus has emerged about the appropriate 
functional forms, and the model used here is in line with this consensus. The values for 
the elasticities have been borrowed from the available econometric literature, however, 
depending on the estimation methods as well as on the period or country considered, 
these values show considerable variation, and has created heated controversies among 
supporters and skeptics of these types of models. Systematic sensitivity analysis, where 
all elasticities are randomly changed and results are presented with accompanying 
confidence intervals, has been proposed as a solution to these controversies. 
Nevertheless, even this rather computationally intensive proposal has its problems and we 
do not attempt it here.  
  The bottom line is that results presented here are indicative of a likely response 
to the analyzed shocks. In most cases, the sign and relative, if not absolute, magnitude of   19
the model’s results – for example, a finding that gains for unskilled labor are larger than 
those for skilled labor – should be reliable.  
  Major advantages of this type of model are that it represents the whole economy 
in a consistent and theoretically sound framework and that the structural features of the 
country investigated strongly influence the final results. Table 3 shows these features for 
Nicaragua in terms of sectoral shares of gross production, imports, exports and private 
demand; the middle panel details, for each sector, the U.S. weight in total trade; the right 
panel shows Nicaraguan tariffs against the U.S. and other partners and the U.S. tariffs 
against Nicaraguan products. For convenience, the bottom panel of the table reports 
measurements for aggregate macro sectors, although the model’s actual 28 sectors are 
shown in the top panel. In commenting on the results of the policy simulations, we will 
refer to data in this table. 
  The initial import protection, both in its level and sectoral variability, is among 
the key elements determining the outcome of the simulated trade reforms. Three key 
features are highlighted by the tariff data: 1) the overall trade-weighted protection rate is 
rather low, 2) its dispersion is high with a clear bias against agricultural imports, and 3) 
tariffs against the U.S. are generally above the trade-weighted average of tariffs against 
the Rest of the World. 
  Table 3 also shows that domestic Nicaraguan agricultural producers may be 
facing strong competition from U.S. imports, which are 41% of total imports of 
agricultural commodities. It is likely that a liberalization of U.S. imports, which reduces 
an anti-agricultural import bias, would lead to an increase of competition in the 
agricultural sectors with a potential initial negative shock for households strongly 
dependent on farming incomes. Clearly, the level of sector aggregation used in the model 
may exacerbate this potentially negative outcome. It may be that at finer sectoral levels, 
one finds that imports and domestic products are complements rather than substitutes. For 
example, lower feed costs could stimulate livestock and poultry productions.  However, 
agricultural products are normally fairly homogeneous, and thus substitutable, and the 
risk of negative impacts should not be completely ruled out. 
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Table 3: Nicaragua’s economic structure (2000) 








Coffee 20 2 00 1 4 2 6860
Sugar Cane 100000000
Basic Grain 3114 7 20 2 9 1 70
Other Agri. Products 3275 1 8384 1 1
Livestock 5133 3 50420
Forestry 1001 9 30110
Fishery 1010 3 45 1 050
Mining 1 1 04014200
Electricity Gas Water 200100 1 060
Water Distribution 100100000
Meat and Fish Products 5 02 3 51 92 71 8 8 3
Sugar Producs 20526 1 1870
Dairy 2133 3 20 1 280
Other Food 482 1 1 1 90741
Beverages 211690 1 260
Tobacco 011129407
Textiles Clothing & Leather 34 1 25 3 95444
Wood Products 2221 2 80830
Paper Print Products 1301 2 10320
Refined Oil 352290770
Chemicals  1 1 726 2 10320
Glass No-Metal Products 131092420
Metal Products 0710 1 50320
Machinery and Equipment 0 2 612 4 00230
Construction 900000000
Commerce 1 000100000
Other Services 29 5 4 28 24 1 0 0 0
Transport Services 5 1 4 8 24 3 0 0 0
Total 100 100 100 100 24 36 4 3
Agriculture 1 7 43 21 34 12 82 0 6
Food Processing 15 12 36 29 18 54 8 4
Mining and Energy 4 1 0431 6 420
Other Manufacturing 12 68 20 19 28 14 3 3

































































                             ---  Aggregate sectors averages ---
 
Source: Nicaragua SAM estimated by the author. 
Notes: In the left panel, Xp represents the sectoral output as a percentage of total output, M the sectoral total 
imports, Ex the exports shares, Xc the private consumption shares. In the middle panel, M US the initial 
share of imports coming from the U.S. over total imports, Ex US the initial share of exports going to the U.S. 
In the right panel, there are tariffs: Nic - US and Nic - ROW are Nicaraguan tariffs against the U.S. and other 
partners imports, respectively, and US - Nic are the U.S. tariffs against Nicaraguan exports.  
 
  The main macro results for the trade policy reforms are described in the 
following subsections. First, we examine the effects of the unilateral non-discriminatory 
full liberalization in the benchmark scenario. Then, the CAFTA case is analyzed and 
compared with the benchmark and the effects of this regional agreement are decomposed 
into those originating from liberalization of Nicaragua with no response from the U.S. 
and those derived from the U.S. reciprocating. Finally, to assess the sensitivity of the 
results to the assumption of factor markets segmentation, both the non-discriminatory and 
the regional trade reforms are simulated allowing perfect factor mobility in the model. 
This set up should more closely represent the likely impact of the reforms in the longer 
run, although no factor accumulation or explicit dynamic effects are accounted for.    21
 
Unilateral liberalization against all trading partners 
 
  As outlined above, the adjustment process caused by this reform is initially 
described in terms of sectoral demand and supply changes as shown in Table 4. Consider 
first the demand/imports side. Initial tariff rates tm
16 are highest in Agriculture and Food 
Processing sectors – in particular in Basic Grains,  Meat and Fish Products,  Sugar 
Products and Dairy – accordingly these sectors experience the largest imports once 
protection is removed. Observing the aggregate results (in the bottom panel of the table), 
import volumes increase (ΔM) by 23% for Agriculture and 6% for Food Processing from 
their pre-liberalization levels; these increases compare with the average 2% increase for 
total imports. However, imports do not represent a large share of local demand (M/D) in 
Agriculture and account for just a moderate one in Food Processing. Thus, even with a 
high elasticity of substitution between local production and imports (3), the impact of 
increased imports on sales of domestic goods (ΔS) for Agriculture and Food Processing 
is very low. Compared to these sectors, the other manufacturing sectors suffer slightly 
larger domestic sales contractions due to their larger initial share of import dependency 
despite their lower initial level of protection. Reflecting Nicaragua’s dependency on 
foreign production of capital goods, intermediates, and energy, imports are well above 
50% of total local demand for Other Manufacturing and just below that threshold for 
energy and mining. For the other manufacturing sectors, cheaper imports displace almost 
3% of domestic production. 
 
                                                 
16 Note that column tm in Table 4 is the trade weighted average of the Nicaraguan tariffs against US and the 
Rest of the World (which are separately shown in Table 3).    22
Table 4: Sectoral effects of full unilateral trade liberalization 
Exports and production
tm ΔM M/D ΔS ΔPd ΔΕx Ex/Xp ΔXp ΔPx
Coffee 6 13 8 -1 -1.4 5 101 4 -0.2
Sugar Cane 0001 - 2 . 2 001 - 2 . 2
Basic Grain 26 55 11 -4 -6.8 27 3 -3 -6.6
Other Agri. Products 5 6 14 0 -2.7 12 26 3 -2.1
Livestock 2241 - 2 . 11 082 - 2 . 0
Forestry 1 - 811 - 4 . 11 921 - 4 . 0
Fishery 6 2 441 0 . 7 - 261 0 . 7
Mining 0 -5 85 -2 -1.1 3 55 1 -0.5
Electricity Gas Water 6 12 2 -1 -2.1 8 0 -1 -2.1
Water Distribution 0 0 0 -1 -0.8 0 0 -1 -0.8
Meat and Fish Products 10 25 4 -1 -1.8 6 53 2 -0.9
Sugar Producs 7 1 81 - 1 - 1 . 2 4 3 31 - 0 . 9
Dairy 91 81 8- 3 - 2 . 3 62 2- 1 - 1 . 8
Other Food 5 3 35 1 -3.9 18 7 2 -3.6
Beverages 6 12 8 -1 -1.8 6 3 -1 -1.7
Tobacco 0 -2 85 -1 -0.5 1 96 0 -0.1
Textiles Clothing & Leather 44 3 8 - 2 - 1 . 8 5 5 51 - 0 . 9
Wood Products 5 7 23 -1 -2.0 7 12 -1 -1.7
Paper Print Products 3 1 55 -3 -1.3 2 3 -3 -1.2
Refined Oil 71 32 6- 6 - 0 . 7 - 3 8- 6 - 0 . 7
Chemicals  20 7 1 - 1 - 1 . 7 6 1 80 - 1 . 4
Glass No-Metal Products 2 2 35 -1 -0.7 2 7 -1 -0.7
Metal Products 2 1 72 0 -1.6 7 16 1 -1.4
Machinery and Equipment 3 1 83 2 -2.9 15 73 10 -1.0
Construction 0001 - 0 . 5 001 - 0 . 5
Commerce 0 0 0 -1 -0.4 0 0 -1 -0.4
Other Services 0 - 350 - 0 . 9 320 - 0 . 9
Transport Services 0 - 560 - 1 . 6 690 - 1 . 5
Total 32 2 3 - 1 - 1 . 5 6 1 20 - 1 . 3
Agriculture 12 23 7 -0.4 -2.9 7 23 1.1 -2.5
Food Processing 5 6 21 -0.7 -2.3 6 28 1.1 -1.8
Mining and Energy 0 -4 48 -0.8 -1.6 3 12 -0.4 -1.5
Other Manufacturing 3 2 57 -2.9 -1.3 5 21 -1.6 -1.0




























                       ---  Aggregate sectors averages ---





































Notes: tm represents initial tariff rates, ΔM the percent variation in total import volumes with respect to the 
initial levels, M/D the ratio of imports to domestic demand (the sectoral import dependency, calculated using 
pre-liberalization levels), ΔS the percent variation in the volumes of domestic sales of domestic output, ΔPd 
the percent variation in domestic prices for local sales, ΔEx the percent variation in the volumes of exports, 
Ex/Xp the ratio of exports to domestic output (the sectoral export orientation), ΔXp the percent change of 
domestic output, and ΔPx the percent change of output prices.      
 
  For the economy as a whole, these low or moderate domestic market share 
losses are reflected in small declines of producer prices for local sales (ΔPd). Some of 
these effects are larger when disaggregated sectors are examined, and complementary 
analyses considering very disaggregated sectors of production may be needed to identify 
specific sensitive commodities.
17  
                                                 
17 These usually analyses consider data at the tariff line level, i.e., at a very fine degree of disaggregation. 
Trade data at this level may be available, but production, consumption and other important data needed to 
calibrate CGE models are normally available at a much more aggregate level. Therefore tariff lines 
analyses are normally partial equilibrium analyses and they should be considered in conjunction with the 
general equilibrium analysis presented here.     23
  These demand/imports effects are linked to the supply response to which we 
now turn. For producers of exportable goods, the reduction of prices in local markets 
(ΔPd) combined with unchanged export prices creates incentives to increase the share of 
sales destined to foreign markets. This export response (ΔEx) varies across sectors and is 
linked to the pattern of Nicaragua’s comparative advantage, which, according to the 
export sectoral distribution (column “Ex” in Table 3) and the export orientation (Ex/Xp 
in Table 4), is within three main sectors: Coffee, Meat and Fish Products, and Textiles 
and Clothing. For these sectors, rising export sales more than offset the reduction of 
domestic sales and lead to an overall increase in sectoral production (ΔXp). In other 
sectors,
18 with lower export orientation, the change in sectoral production is roughly 
equal to the change in local sales (ΔS). Sectors enjoying export led growth record output 
price reductions (ΔPx) that are smaller than those of domestic sales prices (ΔPd) because 
output prices are a combination (CES prices) of fixed export prices and domestic prices.  
  In summary, trade liberalization, even if it consists of eliminating relatively low 
economy-wide protection (3%), entails considerable sectoral structural adjustment.
19 
Within agriculture, Basic Grains is the only sector registering a contraction due to its 
high tariffs and low export orientation. Among other sectors, Coffee and Other 
Agricultural Products enjoy significant export-led growth. Similarly, in the non-farm 
portion of the economy, import competing sectors contract and release resources that 
move toward sectors that were less protected or produced for foreign markets. 
Considering the aggregate averages, the macro-sector Food processing records positive 
output changes, whereas the other non-farm macro sectors experience moderate 
contractions. 
  Changes in factor remunerations, shown in Table 5, are another important aspect 
of the structural adjustment caused by trade reform. Changes in wages and capital returns 
                                                 
18 Due to the sectoral classification used in this model, some sectors in Table 4, notably Tobacco and 
Machinery and Equipment, appear to be both import and export intensive. However, the apparent export 
intensity in these sectors results from dividing low levels of exports (probably re-exports) by even lower 
levels of domestic production. As clearly shown in Table 3, exports of Tobacco and Machinery and 
Equipment jointly account for just 2% of total exports. 
19 Due to the closure rule of the external account, namely the fixing of foreign savings and the full 
employment assumption, the larger expansion of the volumes of exports with respect to import volumes is 
compensated with a real exchange rate depreciation which originates from falling domestic resource costs. 
In other words, exporting sectors expand by employing resources whose relative prices have declined 
because of their falling demand from the contracting import competing sectors.   24
are linked to changes of goods prices through the production technology and the 
functioning of the factor markets. Different production technologies are approximated by 
different factor and intermediate inputs intensities across sectors, as shown in Table 6, 
and factor markets function so as to mimic short-term adjustment possibilities. Capital is 
sector specific, and the farm and non-farm sectors constitute two segmented markets for 
skilled and unskilled labor.  
 
Table 5: Factor price changes due to 
full trade liberalization 
ΔP Δ(P/CPI)
Non-Farm Segment:
Skilled Labor -0.3 2.1
Unskilled Labor 0.6 2.9
Capital -0.6 1.8
Sk/Unsk wage gap -0.9
Farm Segment:
Skilled Labor -4.0 -1.6
Unskilled Labor -6.3 -3.9
Capital 2.7 5.1
Sk/Unsk wage gap 2.5
Price indexes:
Food price index -3.6
Non food price index -1.5
CPI -2.4  
Sources: Author calculations from model results. 
Notes: The first column, ΔP, represents the percent 
variation of the price of each factor with respect to the 
initial levels, and Δ(S/CPI) is the percent variation of 
the price deflated by the Consumer Price Index. 
 
  In the farm segment (which corresponds to the macro-sector Agriculture in the 
previous tables), capital (including land) has a positive real price change and skilled and 
unskilled labor experience wage reductions. The expanding agricultural sectors – shaded 
in Table 6 – are those which use capital relatively more intensively than Basic Grains, the 
contracting sector. The combined Coffee,  Other Agricultural Products and Livestock 
sectors, the largest output gainers, use almost 70% of the total farm capital value added. 
Unskilled labor in Basic Grains contracts relative to skilled labor. 
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Table 6: Value added and employment by sector and factor, and sectoral intermediate uses (%)  
Sk Usk K&L Xint Sk Usk K&L Sk Usk Sk Usk ΔXp
Coffee 3 66 31 29 7 21 10 1 99 4 10 4.4
Sugar Cane 22 77 1 4 0 2 3 7 2 9 8 4 5 0 . 8
Basic Grain 67 71 7 2 9 1 73 1 7 2 9 8 4 1 5 5 - 3 . 4
Other Agri. Products 17 40 43 35 53 16 18 7 93 9 4 2.5
Livestock 43 26 3 3 6 2 01 94 0 4 9 6 3 9 2 3 1 . 6
Forestry 07 52 5 4 7 0 8 3 01 0 0 0 1 1 . 1
Fishery 11 08 9 3 7 1 21 5 4 9 6 3 2 0 . 5
Mining 97 31 8 4 8 0 2 1 5 9 5 0 1 0 . 5
Electricity Gas Water 34 6 59 42 3 0 6 63 37 1 0 -0.6
Water Distribution 20 55 25 37 1 2 1 28 72 1 1 -1.1
Meat and Fish Products 25 46 29 82 2 3 2 21 79 1 1 2.3
Sugar Producs 12 33 55 70 0 1 3 11 89 0 1 0.7
Dairy 35 30 35 71 1 1 2 21 79 0 0 -1.0
Other Food 31 42 27 70 3 3 3 13 87 2 5 2.1
Beverages 48 15 37 60 3 1 3 51 49 1 0 -1.2
Tobacco 44 35 3 4 7 0 0 0 1 3 8 7 0 0 0 . 5
Textiles Clothing & Leather 20 72 7 50 2 6 1 22 78 5 6 1.0
Wood Products 16 75 9 58 1 4 1 9 91 0 1 -0.5
Paper Print Products 28 66 6 61 0 1 0 25 75 0 0 -2.9
Refined Oil 69 0 31 97 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 -5.8
Chemicals  36 35 29 65 1 1 1 27 73 0 0 0.0
Glass No-Metal Products 29 62 9 72 1 1 0 12 88 1 1 -0.6
Metal Products 24 71 5 76 0 1 0 17 83 1 1 1.1
Machinery and Equipment 31 63 6 76 0 0 0 20 80 1 2 10.2
Construction 16 64 20 54 5 17 8 11 89 4 10 1.4
Commerce 33 56 11 29 18 26 7 19 81 23 31 -0.6
Other Services 40 21 39 36 55 24 61 35 65 55 32 -0.4
Transport Services 27 70 3 71 3 6 0 14 86 3 5 0.2
Total 27 41 32 48 200 200 200 16 84 200 200 0.1
Agriculture 6 48 46 35 100 100 100 3 97 100 100 1.1
Food Processing 31 34 35 72 10 9 13 15 85 4 8 1.1
Mining and Energy 26 31 43 42 4 4 8 24 76 2 2 -0.4
Other Manufacturing 24 66 11 71 6 14 3 20 80 9 11 -1.6
Services 35 37 28 41 80 73 76 25 75 85 79 -0.1
Sectoral Intensity
Employment (# of workers)
Sect. Intens. Sect. Shares
Value Added
Sectoral Shares
 ---  Aggregate sectors averages ---
 
Notes: All the values in the table except in the last column are calculated from values in the initial equilibrium. The 
highlighted (shaded) rows are those corresponding to expanding sectors. Sectoral intensity sums to 100% in each sector. Sk 
represents skilled labor, Usk and K&L unskilled labor and capital and land respectively, Xint is the share of intermediate 
inputs in total output, and ΔXp is the percent change of domestic output due to full trade liberalization. 
 
  Turning to the non-farm segment and in the bottom panel of Table 6, it is easy to 
see that Food Processing, the sector with the largest output expansion, is relatively 
intensive in the use of capital, and, in terms of number of workers (rather than value 
added which includes wage differential biases), is the sector that uses most intensively 
unskilled workers. Other Manufacturing, the sector experiencing the largest contraction, 
uses unskilled labor to a large extent but not as intensively as Food Processing. This 
relative intensity in the use of labor combined with the initial levels of protection and 
output changes explains the observed wage movements.    26
  The combination of the trade shock with this production structure explains why 
unskilled labor is the largest gainer in the non-farm segment, followed by skilled labor 
and capital as shown in Table 5. These results are consistent with the comparative 
advantage of Nicaragua, a country with abundant unskilled labor that specializes in the 
production of agriculture derived products. It is also import dependent for capital goods 
and intermediates, which are normally produced by sectors using skilled workers 
intensively. 
  Even with segmented labor markets, the farm and non-farm parts of the 
economy have strong interconnections that determine the final results. These inter-
segment links are illustrated in Table 7 for the Agricultural and the Food Processing 
aggregate sectors.
20 Both sectors face the largest average drops in tariff protection and 
large inflows of imports; however, they also have the largest aggregate output gains. This 
is achieved by significant structural shifts that are qualitatively different for these two 
sectors.  
 For  Agriculture, the main adjustment consists of a reduction of one single sub-
sector and a specialization toward export oriented sectors. Prices for imported 
intermediate goods are reduced by the removal of tariffs. However, due to the moderate 
use of intermediates (35% of total input value), cost savings needed to compete with 
cheaper imports in domestic markets and to increase competitive advantage in export 
markets have to be realized by factor price reductions, and this also explains why labor 
wages are reduced in Agriculture. 
 For  Food  Processing, the inflow of imports does not entail large sectoral 
contractions because producers can still compete in domestic markets by enjoying 
reduced production costs due to their use of cheaper intermediates, which represent on 
average almost three-quarters of total input values. In fact, most of these intermediate 
inputs come from agriculture whose prices are reduced following the trade shock. 
 
                                                 
20 These two sectors account for a third of total production and for almost 40% of total employment.   27




Initial tariffs, % 12 5
Intermediates as % of output 35 72
Share (%) of tot inputs from sector:
Agriculture 22 63
Food Processing 13 14
Mining and Energy 13
Other Manufacturing 52 14
Services 12 6 
 
  Factor price changes as well as the inter-sectoral intermediates cost savings 
explain why certain sectors reduce or marginally increase imports following tariff 
abatement. For instance, the absence of import surges for Livestock, after the market 
opening, is due to increased domestic sales of local producers who can produce at lower 
costs and are able to gain market share. A partial equilibrium framework where tariff 
reduction can only lead to increased imports and lower prices would not account for these 
types of inter-sectoral linkages. 
 
CAFTA bilateral trade liberalization 
 
  The full unilateral trade liberalization serves as a benchmark against which the 
CAFTA regional agreement can be compared. Table 8 reports sectoral results for the 
simulation of this regional free trade agreement. This policy discriminates between 
import origins and has trade diverting effects that may not be compensated by trade 
creation. However, as shown below, this geographic discrimination is not the most 
relevant aspect to be considered in an evaluation of this policy option. 
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Table 8: Effects of the CAFTA agreement on Nicaragua’s economic sectors  
Exports and production
tmUS ΔM M/D ΔS ΔPd ΔΕx Ex/Xp ΔXp ΔPx
Coffee 8381 - 0 . 6 3 1 0 13 - 0 . 1
Sugar Cane 5 5000 - 1 . 3 000 - 1 . 3
Basic Grain 29 54 11 -4 -4.8 17 3 -3 -4.6
Other Agri. Products 8 2 14 1 -0.5 10 26 3 0.1
Livestock 4541 - 0 . 2 282 - 0 . 2
Forestry 1 - 311 - 2 . 21 021 - 2 . 2
Fishery 10 29 4 2 4.4 -15 6 1 4.2
Mining 2 0 85 -1 0.2 -2 55 -1 0.1
Electricity Gas Water 1 0120 0 . 3 - 100 0 . 3
Water Distribution 0000 0 . 5 000 0 . 5
Meat and Fish Products 18 13 4 0 0.4 8 53 4 1.4
Sugar Producs 8210 - 0 . 1 1 3 30 0 . 0
Dairy 12 11 18 -1 -0.3 0 22 -1 -0.3
Other Food 7 1 35 2 -1.9 11 7 3 -1.8
Beverages 1 2480 0 . 0 030 0 . 0
Tobacco 4 0 85 -4 1.5 3 96 2 3.2
Textiles Clothing & Leather 44 3 8 - 1 - 0 . 1 2 5 50 0 . 2
Wood Products 8 4 23 -1 -0.6 1 12 -1 -0.5
Paper Print Products 3 1 55 -1 0.1 -2 3 -1 0.1
Refined Oil 7 2 26 -1 0.0 0 8 -1 0.0
Chemicals  31 7 1 - 1 - 0 . 2 0 1 80 - 0 . 2
Glass No-Metal Products 4 1 35 -1 0.2 -1 7 -1 0.2
Metal Products 3 0 72 -1 -0.1 0 16 -1 -0.1
Machinery and Equipment 2 0 83 -2 -0.2 -1 73 -1 -0.1
Construction 0000 0 . 3 000 0 . 3
Commerce 0000 0 . 7 000 0 . 7
Other Services 0150 0 . 4 - 220 0 . 4
Transport Services 0060 0 . 2 - 190 0 . 1
Total 42 2 30 0 . 0 4 1 20 0 . 1
Agriculture 21 22 7 0.1 -0.9 5 23 1.0 -0.7
Food Processing 8 3 21 0.5 -0.4 6 28 1.9 0.0
Mining and Energy 2 0 48 -0.2 0.3 -2 12 -0.4 0.3
Other Manufacturing 3 1 57 -0.8 -0.1 1 21 -0.5 0.0




























                       ---  Aggregate sectors averages ---





































Notes: tm represents initial tariff rates, ΔM the percent variation in total import volumes with respect to the 
initial levels, M/D the ratio of imports to domestic demand (the sectoral import dependency, calculated using 
pre-liberalization levels), ΔS the percent variation in the volumes of domestic sales of domestic output, ΔPd 
the percent variation in domestic prices for local sales, ΔEx the percent variation in the volumes of exports, 
Ex/Xp the ratio of exports to domestic output (the sectoral export orientation), ΔXp the percent change of 
domestic output, and ΔPx the percent change of output prices. 
 
  Nicaragua’s liberalization of U.S. imports affects just one-quarter of total 
imports (as shown Table 3) and, thus, has a smaller aggregate impact than full unilateral 
trade liberalization. However, the overall structural adjustment and inter-sectoral resource 
reallocations are quite significant due to the large U.S. weight in some critical sectors – 
such as the 72% of Basic Grains imports and the 26% of exports for the two largest 
exporting sectors in Nicaragua, Coffee and Meat and Fish Products. The CAFTA 
agreement obviously includes increased market access for Nicaraguan products in the 
U.S. market. As shown more clearly in the next section, however, this reciprocal 
liberalization amounts to a positive but rather small shock. In the model, the implied   29
increased market access is accounted for by increasing border prices for goods exported 
to the U.S., implicitly assuming that Nicaraguan exporters do not influence domestic 
prices in the U.S. and that they can enjoy the full rents provided by the initial U.S. 
tariffs.
21 Given the initial low level of the U.S. tariffs, these rents are not significant.  
  A preferential bilateral agreement with the U.S. shows some relevant 
divergences from a full liberalization, especially with respect to factor price changes. 
Firstly, the overall price deflation resulting from partial trade reform is roughly equal to 
one-quarter of the deflation induced by complete tariff abatement (see the bottom right 
panel of Table 9). Secondly, a CAFTA agreement entails a liberalization that is not only 
geographically biased but also sectorally distortionary. Consider again the shares of 
imports originating from the U.S. in Table 3. The economy-wide average share is 24%, 
but the imports of the U.S. agricultural goods represent more than 40% of total imports in 
that macro-sector, with peaks of 72% for Basic Grains, which is also the most protected 
sector. Additionally, tariffs against U.S. imports are slightly higher than those against 
other partners. Thus, the CAFTA agreement-induced imports surge of agricultural goods 
is equal to 94% of that induced by a full unilateral liberalization, whereas the economy-
wide average stands at 76%. These sectoral distortions explain why factor returns in the 
farm segment undergo changes that are very close to those experienced in a full 
liberalization scenario. The unskilled labor real wage contraction is in fact the same in the 
two cases, whereas factor returns in the non-farm sector record a smaller percentage of 
the full liberalization shock. 
                                                 
21 A regional multi country model that includes the whole US economy, rather than the current single 
country model, would be better suited to account for all the direct and indirect effects of a liberalization of 
the U.S. tariffs. However, the approach used here, namely to model the U.S. simply as one of Nicaragua’s 
trading partners, can be considered as a reduced form of a more complete multi country model which, 
although theoretically more appealing, has much higher data intensity and empirical implementation costs.    30
Table 9: Factor price changes due to CAFTA 
ΔP Δ(P/CPI) % of Full 
Lib
Non-Farm Segment:
Skilled Labor 0.7 1.2 60
Unskilled Labor 1.0 1.6 55
Capital 0.9 1.5 85
Sk/Unsk wage gap -0.4
Farm Segment:
Skilled Labor -2.0 -1.4 87
Unskilled Labor -4.5 -3.9 100
Capital 4.1 4.7 92
Sk/Unsk wage gap 2.6
Price indexes:
Food price index -1.4 39
Non food price index 0.0 -1
CPI -0.6 24 
Sources: Author calculations from model results. 
Notes: The first column, ΔP, represents the percent variation of the price of 
each factor with respect to the initial levels, and Δ(S/CPI) is the percent 
variation of the price deflated by the Consumer Price Index. The column, % 
of Full Lib, shows the percent ratio of the real price changes in the CAFTA 
scenario with respect to the unilateral non discriminatory full liberalization 
case.   
 
  In summary, the impact on factor remunerations of the examined trade reforms, 
full liberalization and CAFTA agreements, should be positive for urban workers, both 
wage-employed or self-employed with physical capital, but it may, at least temporary, be 
negative for wage workers of the rural sector. Furthermore, the regional agreement 
replicates this negative effect with potential worrying implications for inequality and 
poverty. For agricultural households receiving part of their income from capital and land, 
or even from non-farm activities, the unfavorable farm wage changes should have a less 
harmful effect. Notice also that the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers does 
not significantly change with this kind of trade reform.
22  
 
Decomposing the CAFTA scenario  
 
  In order to distinguish the effects of market access from those of own tariff 
unilateral abatement, the simulated reciprocal CAFTA trade agreement has been 
decomposed into two separate reforms: in the first, Nicaragua unilaterally eliminates all 
                                                 
22 This outcome may not hold under a different production specification where skilled workers, for 
example, are modeled as a complement to capital, rather than as substitutes.    31
tariffs against U.S. imports, and, in the second, the U.S. unilaterally responds, i.e., it 
preferentially liberalizes imports from Nicaragua.
23  
  As anticipated, the opening up of the Nicaraguan market accounts for almost 
three-quarters of the CAFTA variation in imports, exports, and domestic output recorded 
by the reciprocal case. As shown in Table 10, in the case of unilateral U.S. liberalization, 
effects on imports and local sales are more or less muted, and the most visible effects 
consist of some additional specialization in exports of food processing products.  
Table 10: Decomposing sectoral effects of CAFTA 
ΔM ΔS ΔPd ΔΕx ΔXp ΔPx ΔM ΔS ΔPd ΔΕx ΔXp ΔPx
Agriculture 19 -0.1 -1.9 5 1.0 -1.7 3 0.2 1.0 0 0.1 1.0
Food Processing 1 0.5 -1.1 3 1.3 -0.9 1 -0.1 0.7 3 0.6 0.9
Mining and Energy 0 -0.2 -0.2 0 -0.2 -0.2 0 0.0 0.5 -2 -0.2 0.5
Other Manufacturing 1- 0 . 7- 0 . 4 1- 0 . 3- 0 . 3 0- 0 . 2 0 . 3 0- 0 . 2 0 . 3
Services -1 -0.1 -0.1 0 -0.1 -0.1 2 0.1 0.5 -2 0.0 0.5
Total 1 -0.1 -0.6 3 0.3 -0.5 1 0.0 0.6 1 0.1 0.6
Nicaragua Unilat. Lib US Unilat. Lib
Imports and Local 
Sales







Notes: ΔM represents the percent variation in total import volumes with respect to the initial levels, ΔS the percent 
variation in the volumes of domestic sales of domestic output, ΔPd the percent variation in domestic prices for 
local sales, ΔEx the percent variation in the volumes of exports, ΔXp the percent change of domestic output, and 
ΔPx the percent change of output prices. 
 
  As highlighted in Table 10, the two unilateral liberalizations are consistent in 
their sectoral output effects. Both induce additional growth of agricultural and food 
processing sectors and, in this sense, help Nicaragua exploit its comparative advantage. 
Although the U.S. has already granted preferential access to Nicaraguan exports in the 
past, the remaining current U.S. tariffs seem to inhibit potential growth in some key 
sectors in Nicaragua, and obtaining full access to the U.S. markets may then bring some 
advantages. 
                                                 
23 This decomposition is not exact given that the sequence in which these reforms are carried out matters 
for the final results. However, in this particular case, given that the magnitude of the shocks, especially the 
reduction of the U.S. tariffs against Nicaraguan products, is not too large, the order in which the two 
simulations are carried out is almost indifferent.     32
Table 11: Decomposing factor price changes due to CAFTA  
ΔP Δ(P/CPI) % of 
CAFTA
ΔP Δ(P/CPI) % of 
CAFTA
Non-Farm Segment:
Skilled Labor 0.0 1.1 86 0.6 0.2 14
Unskilled Labor 0.5 1.5 94 0.6 0.1 6
Capital 0.2 1.2 81 0.8 0.3 19
Sk/Unsk wage gap -0.4 0.1
Farm Segment:
Skilled Labor -3.2 -2.2 160 1.3 0.8 -60
Unskilled Labor -5.2 -4.1 106 0.7 0.3 -6
Capital 2.1 3.1 67 2.0 1.5 33
Sk/Unsk wage gap 2.1 0.6
Price indexes:
Food price index -2.0 0.6
Non food price index -0.4 0.4
CPI -1.0 0.5
Nicaragua Unilat. Lib US Unilat. Lib
 
Sources: Author calculations from model results. 
Notes: The first column, ΔP, represents the percent variation of the price of each factor 
with respect to the initial levels, and Δ(S/CPI) is the percent variation of the price 
deflated by the Consumer Price Index. The column, % of CAFTA, shows the percent 
ratio of the real price changes in the unilateral liberalizations with respect to the 
bilateral CAFTA case.      
 
  As far as factor market effects are concerned, Table 11 shows that the non-
reciprocal removal of Nicaragua’s tariffs causes factor prices of the non-farm segment to 
vary almost as much as with the CAFTA scenario, leaving a small contribution to the full 
price change to the U.S. unilateral response. Interestingly, the two unilateral 
liberalizations have contrasting price effects for factors in the farm segment. In the case 
of the U.S. liberalizing its tariffs, factor prices go up due to the increased export demand 
and this inflationary effect is not counterbalanced by inflows of cheaper imports. 
However, these inflows explain why factor prices tend to contract with the unilateral 
liberalization of Nicaragua. This shows that increasing market access mitigates the 
potentially negative shocks to farm incomes associated with the liberalization of 
Nicaraguan agricultural markets.  
 
Beyond a short term impact analysis: Full liberalization and CAFTA with fully flexible 
factor markets   
 
  The model used here to evaluate trade policy reform is a static model, which 
only accounts for the allocative efficiency gains originating from trade liberalization. It 
does not measure the potentially vastly larger dynamic gains. For instance, in the current   33
set up, market access does not appear to provide large benefits, but these would be much 
more significant in an analysis that included increased capital flows, productivity gains, 
locking up of important domestic reforms, and other dynamic links between trade 
regimes and growth. In addition to its static nature, the current model imposes extra 
restrictions to the mobility of factors across sectors. This intensifies sectoral price 
responses to tariff abatement: factors “trapped” in sectors hit by import surges experience 
decreasing demand and lower returns. This specification can be very useful to highlight 
potential losers and inform compensatory policies. However, since factors move from 
one sector to another in the longer run, it seems desirable to test the sensitivity of results 
to this mobility assumption. Therefore, to conclude the macro analysis, the full 
liberalization and CAFTA scenarios are replicated in a version of the model where 
factors are fully mobile across all sectors of the economy.  
  In this version sectoral specialization is stronger, and in the full unilateral 
liberalization case, Nicaragua exploits its static comparative advantage in producing 
agricultural goods. As shown in Table 12, Agriculture, which accounts for almost 20% of 
total output, records the largest expansion. In stark contrast, Agriculture contracts in the 
CAFTA scenario. This is because CAFTA is very close to a partial liberalization where 
agriculture imports are granted free access and the rest of the economy remains protected. 
In such a situation, cheaper imports displace domestic agriculture and released factors of 
production find jobs in other sectors. 
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Table 12: Sectoral effects of Nicaragua trade liberalization scenarios 
with perfect factor mobility 
Exports and production
ΔM M/D ΔS ΔPd ΔΕx Ex/X ΔXp ΔPx
Agriculture 17 12 32 7 -2.6 -1.4 19 23 1.8 -0.6
Food Processing 15 5 9 21 -1.1 -1.2 4 28 0.1 -1.0
Mining and Energy 4 0 -4 48 -0.4 -0.6 10 12 0.9 -0.4
Other Manufacturing 12 3 3 57 -2.2 -1.3 8 21 -0.4 -0.9
Services 53 0 0 3 0.3 -0.2 3 2 0.4 -0.2
Total 100 3 4 23 -0.6 -0.7 10 12 0 0
Agriculture 17 21 30 7 -0.9 1.4 -8 23 -2.3 1.0
Food Processing 15 8 5 21 0.3 0.6 27 28 7.1 1.0
Mining and Energy 4 2 1 48 0.4 1.6 0 12 0.4 1.6
Other Manufacturing 12 3 2 57 0.7 -0.2 5 21 1.4 0.0
Services 53 0 6 3 0.5 1.4 -4 2 0.4 1.4





Imports and Local Sales
CAFTA
 
Sources: Author calculations from model results. 
Notes: The first two columns show pre-liberalization levels of sectoral outputs and tariff levels (in 
the top panel these are trade weighted averages of tariffs against all countries, in the bottom panel 
just against the U.S.). For a legend for ΔM, ΔS, ΔPd, ΔEx, ΔXp, ΔPx see Table 10.  
 
  In the full liberalization case, unskilled workers experience an economy-wide 
increase in their real wages. In fact the positive 0.4% increment is an average of the real 
wage changes recorded in the segmented markets case. In that set-up non-farm unskilled 
workers were experiencing a 2.9% raise, but farm workers were facing a –3.9% cut in 
their wages. The contraction of agriculture does not help unskilled workers in the 
CAFTA case. Demand for their services increases in the non-farm sectors but not to a 
level sufficient to compensate for the job losses of the farm sector.  
 
Table 13: Factor price changes with perfect factor 
mobility  
ΔP Δ(P/CPI) ΔP Δ(P/CPI)
Skilled Labor 1.1 2.5 3.0 2.5
Unskilled Labor -1.0 0.4 -1.6 -2.1
Capital 1.8 3.2 5.2 4.7
Sk/Unsk wage gap 2.2 4.7
Price indexes:
Food price index -2.2 -0.1
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Overall, assuming flexible factor markets results in stronger specialization and in a 
slightly higher positive change in real GDP. In the full liberalization case, real GDP 
increases by about 1.1% with perfect mobility and by about 0.6% with segmented factor 
markets while in the CAFTA case the respective values are 1.1% and 0.5%. Assuming 
perfect mobility reduces an additional distortion and, as expected, aggregate results 
account for this improvement toward a first best case. Both perfect mobility as well as 
perfect segmentation are extreme characterizations of the functioning of factor markets, 
and the real situation would probably be in between these two extremes.  
 
3.3  … and micro results: the poverty effects of trade reforms         
  
  The aggregate macro results, specifically the factor and goods price changes, are 
used to shock the micro data to produce a new income distribution. This counterfactual 
distribution accounts for the whole heterogeneity arising from household specific income 
and consumption shares, the θ’s parameters in equations (1) and (2), and it thereby 
includes the full growth and inequality impact originating from the trade shocks. This 
way of obtaining the counterfactual distribution is labeled the “full distribution” 
approach.  
  In fact, a reform of trade policy not only results in different levels of aggregate 
income or GDP – the ‘growth’ impact – but also results in significant divergent shifts 
across factor returns – the distributive or ‘inequality’ impact. In order to appreciate the 
relevance of the distributive effect, we calculate an additional counterfactual distribution 
where incomes for all households are shifted according to the average growth effect, 
irrespective of their specific structure of income or pattern of consumption. This second 
simulated distribution has almost the exact same ‘shape’ as the initial one since almost no 
redistribution has occurred. The qualification is needed because under this 
distributionally neutral method, location specific growth rates are separately applied for 
rural and urban households. This method of calculating an additional simulated 
distribution is labeled the “distribution neutral” approach. A straightforward comparison 
between the full distribution and the distribution neutral results provides an assessment of   36
the distributive effect, excluding the significant distributive effects due to different 
average changes for rural and urban incomes.  
  For the trade reform scenarios analyzed here, the aggregate income change rates 
– consistently estimated by aggregation from the micro data shocked with the factor and 
goods prices changes – are shown in Table 14. 
 
Table 14: Real income rates of change (percent) estimated by aggregation of the household 
surveys 
All Urban Rural
Full unilateral liberalization 1.43 1.66 0.82
CAFTA bilateral liberalization
   Nicaragua and US liberalize 0.84 1.01 0.38
   Nicaragua liberalizes only 0.59 0.82 -0.01
   US liberalizes only 0.24 0.19 0.38
Full unilateral liberalization 1.48 1.73 0.82
CAFTA bilateral liberalization
   Nicaragua and US liberalize 0.91 1.05 0.55
   Nicaragua liberalizes only 0.69 0.88 0.18
   US liberalizes only 0.22 0.16 0.37
Equation (1) used for all households
Equations (1) and (2) used for different groups of households
 
 
  Table 14 highlights that trade liberalization is positive overall, however it tends 
to favor urban households more than rural ones. It also shows that calculating income 
changes for households headed by self-employed farmers with equation (1) creates a 
downward bias. Given the uncertainty linked to the imputation method implied by 
equation (1), we report poverty results when the income changes are estimated using the 
combined method of equations (1) and (2).
24  
  These results are also clearly summarized in Figure 3: a gain of around 2% is the 
most likely change in income for a random household in the full liberalization scenario, 
and a gain close to 1% has the highest probability of occurring in the CAFTA case, which 
also shows less dispersion around this average gain.  
                                                 
24 The figures in Table 14 are not fully consistent with those obtained from the CGE model. In fact even by 
modifying the SAM in accordance with the household survey, some discrepancies between the macro and 
micro databases remain. Besides, as already outlined, despite the segmentation in the factor markets of the 
CGE model, intra segment factors’ mobility is allowed, and substitution across goods in consumption is 
permitted, whereas this is not case for the micro data. At the micro level, individuals never switch jobs and 
households’ consumption patterns do not change: the parameters θ’s are fixed.   37
 
































  Table 15 shows the poverty effects estimated using the full distribution and the 
distributionally neutral approaches for the simulated unilateral non-discriminatory 
liberalization and CAFTA agreement. The initial poverty conditions in Nicaragua, as 
depicted by the indicators shown in the top panel of Table 15, are quite worrisome. 
Nicaragua is one of the poorest countries in Latin America with about half the population 
poor and more than 20% extremely poor. The situation looks even worse for the rural 
area where almost two-thirds of the population is poor and one-third is extremely poor. 
The poverty gap (PG) suggests that, for the whole sample, the perfectly targeted cash 
transfer needed to lift every poor person out of poverty is 21% of the poverty line, with 
considerable variations among the rural and urban portions of the sample. Inequality 
among the poor, measured by the severity index (P2), seems to be fairly high for the rural 
population. High population growth rates have offset the positive GDP growth rate of the 
last decade and in 2001 there were as many poor as in 1993. Nicaragua registers fertility 
rates that are twice the Latin American average, and its overall social situation is 
furthermore aggravated by high incidence of domestic violence, malnutrition, high   38




Table 15: Initial poverty levels
26 and percent changes due to trade reforms 
HP GP 2
Initial levels All PovLine 49.8 21.0 11.6
ExtremePL 21.0 6.9 3.3
Urban PovLine 39.8 14.9 7.6
ExtremePL 12.5 4.1 1.9
Rural PovLine 63.9 29.5 17.1
ExtremePL 32.9 10.9 5.3
HP GP 2HP GP 2
Full unilateral lib. All PovLine -1.6 -3.7 -4.9 -1.3 -2.0 -2.4
(segmented) ExtremePL -4.4 -6.9 -9.6 -2.5 -3.0 -3.1
Urban PovLine -2.5 -6.3 -8.4 -1.6 -2.8 -3.2
ExtremePL -7.0 -11.3 -15.5 -2.5 -3.5 -3.8
Rural PovLine -0.9 -1.8 -2.8 -0.4 -1.0 -1.2
ExtremePL -3.1 -4.6 -6.7 -1.0 -1.6 -1.7
CAFTA bilateral lib. All PovLine -0.3 -1.2 -1.4 -0.7 -1.2 -1.5
(segmented) ExtremePL -0.9 -1.8 -2.5 -1.1 -1.8 -2.0
Urban PovLine -0.4 -2.3 -2.8 -1.2 -1.7 -2.0
ExtremePL -1.0 -3.4 -4.4 -1.3 -2.1 -2.4
Rural PovLine -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 -0.6 -0.8
ExtremePL -0.8 -1.0 -1.5 -0.7 -1.1 -1.2
Absolute levels
Percent changes from initial levels
Initial distribution
Full distribution Neutral distribution
 
 
  In the long run, an open and transparent trade policy enhances growth 
opportunities by – among other things – facilitating access to new technologies, 
promoting foreign direct investment, and increasing incentives for pursuing balanced 
domestic macro policies. In general, it can help reduce poverty. Nonetheless, in this 
paper, only the short-term impacts of trade reforms on poverty are considered, focusing 
on the potential immediate problems or benefits for the poor, which helps formulate any 
compensatory measures.  
  Overall, both liberalization scenarios marginally reduce poverty in Nicaragua, 
with the non-discriminatory one being more pro-poor than CAFTA. A positive aspect is 
                                                 
25 For a full analysis of the poverty situation and its evolution in the last decade see World Bank Report No. 
20488 NI, titled “Nicaragua Poverty Assessment, volumes 1 and 2.  
26 Although informative, the rural and urban poverty measurement obtained using a single national poverty 
line may be to some extent misleading. Price levels and the corresponding purchasing powers in the rural 
and urban sectors of the economy can be quite different so the zone specific poverty lines should be used to 
guarantee more accurate estimates.   39
that percentage reductions are larger when poverty is measured at the extreme poverty 
line than at the normal one.  
  Both trade liberalization scenarios induce larger poverty reductions for the urban 
than the rural population. However, the two scenarios differ in their distributive impacts. 
For the non-discriminatory liberalization, poverty reductions (across all categories) are 
actually higher in the full distribution approach than in the distribution neutral one, 
suggesting that this type of trade reform induces a pro-poor distributional shift. The 
opposite happens in the CAFTA scenario. Notice that comparing the full and the neutral 
distributional approaches accounts only for the distributive shift that is left after the 
different ‘growth’ effects from Table 14 are applied to the urban and rural areas. This net 
distributive shift is due to what happens within the urban and rural areas and is caused by 
anti- or pro-poor changes in factor relative prices and inputs or output commodity prices. 
Incomes of poor people are determined, on the one hand, by transfers, auto-consumption 
and other transactions unaffected by changes in market prices, and, on the other hand, by 
unskilled labor wages, or profits for the self employed farmers (besides the changes in the 
costs of final consumption). In the case of the full unilateral liberalization experiment, as 
shown in Table 5, unskilled labor wages, in the farm segment, are declining more steeply 
than returns of the other factors; however they are increasing more rapidly in the non-
farm segment. In the CAFTA scenario, the farm unskilled wages contraction is about the 
same as in the full liberalization (see the last column of Table 9) and, for the same type of 
labor, this is not compensated by a higher increase in the non-farm segment. Besides in 
the farm sectors, the ratio of output to input prices tends to be more favorable to the self-
employed farmers in the non-discriminatory liberalization than in the CAFTA case.  
  The complete distributional effect can be seen in Figure 4, which plots incidence 
curves for the two trade policy reforms, and for the total, urban and rural populations. 
These graphs confirm the observations based on the more aggregate indicators of the 
previous table: the urban population enjoys larger gains and the full liberalization 
scenario is more progressive than CAFTA.     40
Figure 4: Mean Percentage Gains by Per Capita Income Percentile: Full Liberalization (top 
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  An additional way of examining the impacts of trade policy reforms on poverty 
is offered in Table 16. In particular this table highlights the small proportion of 
individuals losing because of the reforms: 15% and 18% for the two cases considered. It 
also signals what we have already reported, namely that there are potential risks for the 
rural poor: within this specific category, the share of people experiencing income losses 
can reach more than 33%.  
   41
Table 16: trade induced gains and losses (percentages with respect to pre-liberalization levels)  
Full lib. CAFTA (N + US)
(segmented) (segmented)


























NPoor-Rural 28.89 24.89 
Note: Poor and non-poor are defined at the initial income level. 
The results are the case of the "full distribution" approach. 
 
  Having identified some variation in the effects of trade liberalization across 
households, it would be interesting to see how these effects vary with observed household 
characteristics; identifying strong correlates should help in designing compensatory 
policies. To do that, the logarithm of the change in per capita incomes
27 under different 
scenarios considered above is regressed on the age, age squared, gender and education 
level of household head, the logarithm of household size, the ratios of number of infants 
(age 0-5) and children (6-12) to household size, urban and regional dummies, the ratio of 
number of workers to household size, and the ratios of number of agricultural and skilled 
                                                 
27 These incomes are computed by separating out auto-consumption and using household-specific price 
indices. In addition, the simulated incomes are calculated under the full distribution approach.   42
workers to the total number of workers in the household.
28 They are estimated by 
Ordinary Least Squares and the results are summarized in Table 17. 
 
Table 17: Regression for logarithms of income changes 
Note: The dependent variables are the percentage change from the initial income. Significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated 
by ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
  As expected, the two scenarios display similar results. Education variables 
unambiguously show that the more educated the household head, the larger the 
percentage gains of the household, which seems to coincide with the positive coefficient 
                                                 
28 A similar regression analysis is found in Chen and Ravallion (2003). 
Robust Robust
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Household head's characteristics
   age 0.019 0.012 ***0.030 0.011
   age squared -1.20E-04 1.14E-04 **-2.20E-04 1.04E-04
   female -0.035 0.061 ***-0.174 0.057
   education
     (no education)
     primary or less ***0.323 0.065 ***0.414 0.063
     secondary ***0.407 0.095 ***0.423 0.093
     technical ***0.428 0.149 ***0.369 0.128
     university or above 0.271 0.288 ***0.994 0.146
Demographic variables
   logarithm of hhsize ***-0.363 0.071 ***-0.235 0.064
   ratio of no. of infants (0-5) to hhsize -0.283 0.244 -0.245 0.221
   ratio of no. of children (6-12) to hhsize 0.278 0.198 0.199 0.190
Geographic variables
   urban 0.021 0.092 *-0.140 0.079
   regions
     (Managua)
     Pacific ***-0.296 0.070 ***-0.381 0.065
     Central ***-0.415 0.084 ***-0.333 0.076
     Atlantic -0.142 0.102 0.059 0.098
Employment variables
   Ratio of wokers to household size 0.164 0.140 ***0.894 0.132
   Ratio of agri. workers to total workers ***-2.470 0.115 ***-2.536 0.098
   Ratio of skilled workers to total workers **0.212 0.088 ***0.405 0.083
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on the ratio of skilled workers. This can be partly explained by the fact that more 
unfavorable effects on wage were observed for unskilled labor in the farm sector under 
both scenarios (see Tables 5 and 9 above).  
  There also seems to be some geographical variation in the impacts of the 
reforms. It is rather puzzling to see the negative coefficient on the urban dummy under 
CAFTA, though significant only at a 10% level. But the coefficients on the regional 
dummies show that households in the capital Managua (the largest urban center) tend to 
gain more from trade liberalization. The negative coefficient on the logarithm of 
household size is not very intuitive given the food price declines.  However, the greater 
the ratio of household members in the labor force, the more would the household benefit 
from trade reforms. Finally, given the price changes employed in these simulation 
exercises, the sign and significance of the coefficient on the ratio of household members 
working in the farm sector are self-explanatory. Some of the counter-intuitive results 
from these regressions emphasize the importance of using the full distribution of income, 
as opposed to just average poverty and inequality indicators, to fully understand what 






  This paper analyzes the income distribution and poverty impacts of various trade 
options currently under the scrutiny of Central American policy makers, and in particular, 
it assesses for Nicaragua the poverty effects of the DR-CAFTA recently signed between 
five Central American countries plus the Dominican Republic and the U.S. The 
methodology adopted here relies on a general equilibrium macro model, used to simulate 
various trade reform scenarios and to estimate the price effects of these scenarios, and a 
micro-module which maps the aggregate general equilibrium price changes onto 
variations of real incomes at the individual household levels. Among the various 
assumptions that make this complex analysis treatable, the main one consists of taking   44
into account just the short-term impacts. In fact, the simulations carried out in this 
analysis do no consider the gradual multi-year phasing in of the liberalization scenarios. 
The ‘big-bang’ implementation of the scenarios, where tariffs are eliminated in a single 
step, implicitly assumes that negatively affected parties have to adjust instantaneously to 
the new situation and it is useful because it permits highlighting potential problems 
linked to the new commercial policies. These potential problems may not materialize in 
the real world given that trade reforms, such as the current DR-CAFTA agreement, 
envision gradual phase out of tariffs and other protection measures over a 15 to 20 year 
time span. In such a time horizon, growth effects derived from investments in physical 
and human capital and increased flows of foreign direct investment (a potential important 
indirect benefit of trade reforms), as well as large consumption shifts toward services due 
to higher incomes per capita, can strongly enhance the adjustment capacity of economic 
agents and can even reverse initial negative results.  
  Notwithstanding these simplifications, important economic policy messages can 
be inferred from the analysis in this paper. The first is that different trade policy options 
can produce quite different aggregate and poverty effects. Due to the sectoral 
concentration of imports coming from the U.S. and the initial tariff structure, which is 
biased in favor of Basic Grains, a strong agricultural import inflow entailed by a regional 
agreement with the U.S. seems to raise some concerns for a short-term potentially 
unfavorable rural poverty effect in a big-bang scenario. This occurs as cheaper grains 
from the U.S. enter the Nicaraguan market and depress prices and factor returns of 
farmers. Adoption of a (‘big-bang’) regional liberalization should be counterbalanced in 
the short term – during which farmers cannot easily switch occupations or even crops 
they cultivate, and these difficulties are particularly serious for small poor farmers – by 
two additional policy interventions such as a further non-discriminatory trade 
liberalization and a compensatory transfers policy targeted toward poor farmers. Through 
the first, as shown in the unilateral full trade liberalization simulation, the sectoral 
imbalance in import inflows should be corrected and thus also the price bias against the 
rural factors. And the second transfer policy should temporarily assist farmers in their 
adjustment toward expanding sectors.   45
  In fact this advice is fully consistent with a key policy recommendation that 
emerges from the literature on regional trade agreements,
29 specifically that benefits of 
regional agreements normally outweigh their costs when protection against outsiders is 
low. The poverty results produced in this paper appear to reinforce this view: to boost 
trade-induced poverty reductions, Nicaragua should consider enlarging its own 
liberalization to countries other than the U.S.  
  Another important conclusion is that factor price changes appear to have a more 
important role than goods price changes across the various transmission channels 
between trade reform and poverty. Therefore subsidizing consumption may be less 
effective than subsidizing employment or directly supporting income of the poorer, 
however, this should only be temporary and well targeted. 
  The results presented in this paper are broadly consistent with those obtained in 
other existing studies on DR-CAFTA, which illustrate the overall positive impact of DR-
CAFTA on Central American economies based on CGE models (e.g., Brown et al., 2005; 
Hilaire and Yang, 2004; Francois et al., 2005). Francois et al. (2005), for instance, 
illustrate the further export specialization on the textile and apparel sector shifting 
resources away from agricultural sectors, which can generate significant adjustment 
strains. Given the increasing competition from China in the textile and apparel sector, 
they argue for the importance of implementing policies aimed at diversifying exports and 
increasing agricultural competitiveness. Moreover, Brown et al. (2005) also find that 
Central American countries would enjoy a larger welfare gain from unilateral free trade 
than CAFTA as shown in our simulation analysis. 
  The main limitation of these studies is, however, that Central American 
countries are treated as one entity and the differences in the economic structures and 
endowments within the region are not taken into account. Among the countries, the 
poverty rates vary from 20% in Costa Rica to 60% in Nicaragua (Francois et al., 2005) 
and the GNI per capita of Nicaragua was only US$790 in 2004 while it was US$4,670 for 
Costa Rica.
30 The latter also has a larger fraction of its industrial exports classified as 
high-technology products unlike the rest of the member countries (Francois et al., 2005). 
                                                 
29 See for excellent surveys World Bank (2000): Trade Blocks, and World Bank (2005): Global Economic 
Prospects 2005: Trade, Regionalism, and Development.  
30 World Development Indicators 2005.   46
These differences highlight the need to evaluate the impact of DR-CAFTA on Central 
American economies individually, particularly from the poverty perspective. We hope 
that our analysis has contributed to the better understanding of the impact of DR-CAFTA 
on poverty by examining the case of Nicaragua where poverty is most severe in this 
region and by accounting for the heterogeneity of economic activities and preferences 
among individual households. 
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6 Annexes 
 
1 – The Social Accounting Matrix 
 
The Social Accounting Matrix for Nicaragua has been estimated using the 2000 
input output table provided by the Central Bank of Nicaragua as a starting point. The 
Central Bank base year for the national accounts is 1994 and the latest update for the 
input output table is the year 2000.  
Given our interest in income distribution and trade, the input output table has been 
modified to include more factors of production and multiple trading partners. We have 
disaggregated the value added accounts and estimated payments from the various 
production sectors to three separate factors: skilled labor, unskilled labor and composite 
capital (which includes payments to land). The sectoral employment and average wages 
for these factors have been derived from the 2001 LSMS survey and the classifications of 
sectors used in the survey and the input output table have been merged in a consistent 
common classification shown below in the list of the SAM accounts. Using the household 
survey to modify the value added reported in the input output table is a crucial step given 
that the main link between the macro and micro modules is given by the sectoral factor 
returns. Inconsistencies in the estimation of value added between the input output and the 
household survey – each uses different definitions, sampling, and reference moments in 
time (recall for instance that the National Accounts are based on some technical 
coefficient estimated for the year 1994) – cannot be fully eliminated. However, our 
simple ‘reconciliation’ approach assures a minimum of compatibility across the two data 
source so that our macro-micro model can produce sensible results.  
The imports and exports accounts as well as the tariff rates have been estimated 
using the UN Comtrade database for different trading partners, including the U.S., the 
rest of Central America, the European Union and others (although in the model version 
used here, we just distinguish between the U.S. and the Rest of the World). Tariff rates 
for the commodities included in the model have been calculated as weighted averages 
using imports flows as weights. Tariff revenues calculated with this procedure have been   50
compared with those reported by the Central Bank and the resulting discrepancies were 
negligible.  
 
Table 18: List of accounts for Nicaragua SAM (2000) 
English short label English label Spanish label
1 ACoffee Coffee Café oro
2 ASugarCane Sugar Cane Caña de azúcar
3 ABasicGrain Basic Grains Granos básicos
4 AOthAgrPr Other Agricultural Products Otros productos agrícolas
5 ALivestock Livestock Animales vivos y productos animales
6 AForestry Forestry Productos de la silvicultura y extracción de madera
7 AFishery Fishery Pescado y productos de la pesca
8 AMining Mining Productos mineros
9 AEleGasWat Electricity Gas Water Electricidad, gas de ciudad, vapor y agua caliente
10 AWatDistr Water Distribution, Sewers Agua y alcantarillado
11 AMeatFishPr Meat Fish Products carnes y pescados
12 ASugarPr Sugar Products Azúcar
13 ADairy Dairy Lácteos
14 AOthFood Other Food Otros alimentos de origen industrial
15 ABever Beverages Bebidas
16 ATobacco Tobacco Tabaco
17 ATextClotLeat Textiles Clothing Leather Hilados, tejidos, prendas de vestir, productos de cuero y calzado
18 AWoodPr Wood Products Productos de madera, muebles y otros productos transportables
19 APaperPrint Paper Print Pasta de papel, papel y productos de papel, impresos y artículos análogos
20 ARefOil Refined Oil Productos de petróleo refinado
21 AChemPr Chemicals and other Products Productos químicos básicos y elaborados: Productos de caucho y plásticos
22 AGlassNoMetPr Glass Non Metal Products Vidrio, productos de vidrio y otros productos no metálicos n.c.p.
23 AMetPr Metal Products Metales comunes y productos metálicos elaborados
24 AMachEqp Machinery and Equipment Maquinaria y equipo de transporte
25 AConstruct Construction Construcciones
26 ACommerce Commerce Comercio, reparaciones de automóviles y productos de recuperación
27 AHotRest Hotels and Restaurants Servicios de hoteles y restaurantes
28 ATrspServ Transport Services Servicios de transporte
29 ACommtServ Communication Services Servicios de correos y comunicaciones
30 AFinServ Financial Services Servicios de intermediación financiera y servicios conexos
31 ARealEst Real Estate Servicios inmobiliarios y alquileres de vivienda
32 ABusinServ Business Services servicios empresariales
33 APAServ Public administarion Services Servicios de administración pública
34 AEducPrv Private Education Servicios de enseñanza de mercado
35 AEducPA Public Education Servicios de enseñanza de no mercado
36 AHealthPrv Private social and health services Servicios sociales y de salud de mercado
37 AHealthPA Public social and health services Servicios sociales y de salud de no mercado
38 AAssocServ Other Services Servicios de asociaciones, esparcimiento y otros servicios
39 ADomServ Domestic Services Servicios domésticos
40 LABUS  Skilled Urban Labor
41 LABUU UnSkilled  Urban  Labor
42 LABRS  Skilled Rural Labor
43 LABRU  UnSkilled rural Labor
44 KAPU Urban Capital
45 KAPR Rural Capital
46 PRDTX Production Taxes
47 INDTX Indirect taxes
48 DIRTX Direct Taxex




53 DELST Variation of stocks
54 ROW1 US
55 ROW2 Rest Of the World
56 BOP International Financial Account
57 tot Total  
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Aggregate intermediate demand 
Intermediate 
demand 
σ = 0 
Value Added 
Capital + Labor Aggregate 
Land 
Labor  Capital  Intermediate 
demand by 
region of origin 









Note: Although the model allows substitution between Land and the other primary 
factors, given that the data for separating land and other factors contributions to value 
added was not available, the nesting structure actually active in the current model does 
not include Land as a separate factor.  
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3 – Formal derivation of poverty effects in the micro module 
 
 
The indirect utility function of household h is a function of the income yh and of a 
vector of prices of goods, p.
 31 That is: 
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Dividing both sides by the marginal utility of income ( ) h h dy dv  and using Roy’s 
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where dwh is the monetary value of the change in indirect utility, ch,g is the consumption 
of good g by household and dpg is the change in price of good g. Income of household h 
is given by the sum of labor income, remittances (which are a function of wages), profits 
associated with production of a particular good and income obtained through government 
transfers (partly tariff revenue): 
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31 The following formalization is just an adaptation of that found in Nicita and Olarreaga (2004) “Trade, 
Trade reforms and Poverty in Ethiopia”.  
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where w is the wage rate,  h l is the (net) amount of labor sold in the market by household 
h;  h R  are remittances received by household h,  h π  is the rental rate and Kaph is the 
amount of land or other physical capital own by the household (and used in the household 
production of goods directly sold in the market); Gh are government transfers to 
household h not associated with tariff revenue,  h φ is the share of tariff revenue 
redistributed to household h and the sum that follows is the tariff revenue collected over 
all goods g .  
To be consistent with the CGE model three further assumptions follow: i) 
households choose optimally the amount of labor to sell in the labor market; ii) 
households choose optimally the amount to produce in their own business and iii) all 
remittances are associated with transfers from non-poor individuals who obtained their 
income in the labor market, i.e., 
R
h h w R / = l  where 
R
h / l is the (net) amount of labor that 
gets transferred to household h as remittances. Then, differentiating (4) using Hotelling’s 
Lemma and the Envelope theorem, yields: 
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Substitute equation (5) into (3), divide everywhere by income of household h 
assuming that income equals expenditure, and rearrange terms to obtain: 
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where a “dot” on top of the variable expresses percentage changes;  h g , h g
c
g , h y c p = θ is 
the share of expenditure (or income) spent on good g by household h;  h h h y wl
l = θ  is 




h y w / / = θ l is 
the share of income that household h obtains as remittances; 
kap
h θ is the share of income of 
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share of transfers from the government to household h associated with tariff revenue in 
good g on total income of household h. 
Because we are interested on the impact of tariff reforms on the welfare of poor 
households, to apply equation (6) we need the changes in pg, w and  h π that follow a trade 
reform and these are given by the general equilibrium prices obtained in the CGE. Notice 
also that the estimates obtained by using equation (6) take into account only first order 
effects. Indeed household substitute goods in their consumption bundle, enter and exit the 
factor markets, and, therefore, full effects should also consider changes in the shares 
kap
h θ  
c
g h, θ ,
l
h θ  (but these require a fully blown micro-simulation model).  
  In order to express the change in welfare in monetary units, one simply needs to 
multiply the expression in (6) by household income, then usual estimates of poverty 
effects are straightforward.  
 
 
 